The Mind-Body Problem<\/u><\/p>\n
-concerns the relation between mental events and physical events in the brain<\/p>\n
The Problem of Other Minds<\/u><\/p>\n
-concerns how people come to believe that other people Por animals) are also conscious<\/p>\n
-it proposes that mind and body are two different kinds of entities<\/p>\n
-closely associated with Rene Descartes<\/p>\n
-the classical version of dualism<\/p>\n
-proposes that mind and body are conceived as two different substances<\/p>\n
Physical Matter<\/u><\/p>\n
-all ordinary physical matter has a well-defined position, occupies volume, shape, mass, etc.<\/p>\n
-They differ from physical substances in their fundamental properties<\/p>\n
-Conscious experiences, such as perceptions, remembrances, beliefs, hopes and desires do not have readily identifiable positions, volumes, shapes and masses.<\/p>\n
-Visual experiences do have physical locations and extensions.<\/p>\n
-Ex: my perception of a red ball on the table has a volume and a location.<\/p>\n
-However, substance dualists would suggest that these are perceptual experiences.<\/p>\n
Subjective Phenomena<\/u><\/p>\n
-experiences cannot be observed by anyone but the person experiencing them<\/p>\n
Objective Phenomena<\/u><\/p>\n
-ordinary matter and events that can be observed by anyone<\/p>\n
-referring to things other than themselves<\/p>\n
-is the power of minds to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs -ordinary matter does not have intentionality.<\/p>\n
Directedness of visual experience<\/u>:<\/p>\n
-the physical object you experiences has fundamental properties, the experiences don\u2019t.<\/p>\n
-a form of dualism in which properties are taken to be nonphysical<\/p>\n
-it is as though the physical brain contains some strange nonphysical features or dimensions that are qualitatively distinct from all physical features or dimensions.<\/p>\n
-the view that, although there is just one kind of substance \u2013 that identified by physics \u2013 there are two different kinds of property, mental and physical.<\/p>\n
-mental features or dimensions<\/p>\n
-attributes that do not arise in ordinary matter unless it reaches a certain level of complexity<\/p>\n
-Claims that the mental and physical worlds can interact causally with each other in both directions -Descartes\u2019 view<\/p>\n
-Not all dualists are interactionists<\/p>\n
-A form of interactionism that shows how physical events can cause mental events of conscious experience<\/p>\n
-ex: amputees feel excruciating pain in their missing limbs<\/p>\n
-an alternative form of dualism<\/p>\n
-recognizes mental entities as being different in kind from physical ones, and denies that mental states play any causal role in the unfolding of physical events<\/p>\n
-an epiphenomenalist would argue that mental states are just side effects of the underlying neural events that take place in our brains<\/p>\n
-causation only runs in one direction, from physical to mental<\/p>\n
-there is only one sort of stuff, physical or mental<\/p>\n
-2 sorts of monist positions: idealism and materialism<\/p>\n
-a monist who believes there is no physical world, only mental events<\/p>\n
-\u201cideas\u201d populate the mental world<\/p>\n
-Bishop Berkeley maintained this term, and it is not as common<\/p>\n
-Berkeley would answer: \u201cGod is responsible for coordination\u201d<\/p>\n
-a monist who believes that only physical entities exist, not mental events -contrast to idealism<\/p>\n
-2 forms of materialism: reductive materialism and eliminative materialism<\/p>\n
-also called \u201cmind-brain identity theory\u201d<\/p>\n
-mental events will ultimately be reduced to material events<\/p>\n
-this view allows for mental states to be explained in physical terms by observing the bodily states<\/p>\n
-ex: one would still say \u201cJohn is hungry\u201d rather than \u201cthe pattern of neural firing is occurring in John\u2019s hypothalamus\u201d Pi.e. mental concepts are redefined in terms of brain states and events, but will be scientifically useful)<\/p>\n
-stronger view than reductive materialism<\/p>\n
-mental states will be eliminated and there are only physical states<\/p>\n
-mental concepts can be explained by underlying neurological events<\/p>\n
-it is not accurate to say \u201cJohn is hungry,\u201d but it is accurate to talk about the \u201cpattern of neural firing\u201d<\/p>\n
-Eliminativists agree with vitalism<\/p>\n
-the view that distinguishes living from non-living things is a mysterious distinct force or substance that is present in living objects and absent in non-living ones.<\/p>\n
-The view that the proper way to talk about mental events is in terms of the overt, observable movements Pbehaviors) in which an organism engages<\/p>\n
-The Behaviorist Movement began with John Watson<\/p>\n
-Looking at objective experiments rather than introspection or perceptions<\/p>\n
-Methodological Behavior: objective, behaviorally-defined experimental methods<\/p>\n
-Instead of saying \u201cJohn is hungry,\u201d which openly refers to a conscious mental experience Phunger) with which everyone is presumably familiar, a theoretical behaviorist would say something like \u201cJohn has a propensity to engage in eating behavior in the presence of food.\u201d<\/p>\n
Theoretical Behaviorism Fails Because:<\/u><\/p>\n Epistemic Status of Mental States<\/u><\/p>\n -how we have come to understand mental states in other people<\/p>\n Ontological Status of Mental States<\/u><\/p>\n -what people\u2019s inherent nature is<\/p>\n -A given mental state can be defined in terms of the causal relations that exist among that mental state, environmental conditions Pinputs), organismic behaviors Poutputs), and other mental states. -Functionalists attempted to block reductive materialism by suggesting new criticisms of mindbrain identity theory Pi.e. multiple realizability)<\/p>\n -a functionalism perspective<\/p>\n -the fact that many different physical devices can serve the same function provided they causally connect inputs and outputs in the same way via internal states.<\/p>\n -If an alien had the same internal states and physical appearances as us humans, a functionalist would say they would have the same functions.<\/p>\n -Corresponds to the algorithmic level and the implementation level<\/p>\n The algorithmic level:<\/u><\/p>\n -Corresponds roughly to the functional description of the organism in terms of the relations among its internal states, its input information, and its output behavior.<\/p>\n The implementation level:<\/u><\/p>\n -Corresponds to its actual physical construction.<\/p>\n Supervenience:<\/u><\/p>\n -Coined by Jaegwon Kim<\/p>\n -It means that any difference in conscious events requires some corresponding difference in underlying neural activity.<\/p>\n -In other words, mental events supervene on neural events because no two possible situations can be identical with respect to their neural properties while differing in their mental properties. -Supervenience claims that no changes in consciousness can take place without some change in neural activity.<\/p>\n -How do I know whether another creature Por machine) has conscious experiences? -This is a private, subjective experience on my own, because everyone is different.<\/p>\n 1) Behavioral similarity<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n –<\/em>Other people act in ways that are roughly similar to my own actions when I am having conscious experiences.<\/p>\n 2) Physical similarity<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n -Other people and various other species of animals are similar to me in their basic biological and physical structure. We are all made of the same kind of flesh, blood, bone, and so forth, and we have roughly the same kinds of sensory organs.<\/p>\n ***Only the two together are convincing.<\/p>\n The Inverted-Spectrum Theory:<\/u><\/p>\n -Concerns our perceptual experiences of color.<\/p>\n -It refers to the possibility that my color experiences are exactly like your own, except for being spectrally inverted.<\/p>\n -The claim of the inverted spectrum argument is that no one would ever be able to tell that you and I have different color experiences.<\/p>\n The Trichromatic Theory of Color Vision<\/u><\/p>\n -Based on the premise that there are three classes of cone receptors for color vision<\/p>\n -Some people have a gene that causes their long-wavelength PL) cones to have the same pigment as their medium-wavelength PM) cones.<\/p>\n -Other people have a different form of red-green color blindness because they have a different gene that causes their M cones to have the same pigment as their L cones.<\/p>\n Red-Green-Reversed Trichromats:<\/u><\/p>\n -People with the genes for both forms of red-green color blindness, however, would be redgreen-reversed trichromats.<\/p>\n Two Types of Shadows of Consciousness to Study:<\/u><\/p>\n -Based on behavioral criteria<\/p>\n -Turing imagined an objective behavioral procedure and set up an imitation game<\/em>. -A person is seated at a computer terminal that allows her to communicate either with a real person or with a computer that has been programmed to behave intelligently. The interrogator is allowed to ask anything she wants. If the interrogator could not tell the difference between interacting with real people and with the computer, Turing asserted that the computer should be judged \u201cintelligent.\u201d It would then be said to have \u201cpassed Turing\u2019s test.\u201d<\/p>\n -Turing\u2019s test is a strictly behavioral test because the interrogator has no information about the physical attributes of the subject, but only about its behavior.<\/p>\n Correlational statements:<\/strong> it is only a claim with no explanation; it does not explain why an association exists Pthere is no casual analysis for consciousness)<\/p>\n Causal statements: <\/strong>One thing causes another, and sometimes vice versa. No causal examples about consciousness have been made.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The Mind-Body Problem -concerns the relation between mental events and physical events in the brain The Problem of Other Minds -concerns how people come to believe that other people… Continue Reading Visual Awareness<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[113],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.amyork.ca\/academic\/zz\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4460"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.amyork.ca\/academic\/zz\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.amyork.ca\/academic\/zz\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.amyork.ca\/academic\/zz\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.amyork.ca\/academic\/zz\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4460"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.amyork.ca\/academic\/zz\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4460\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.amyork.ca\/academic\/zz\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4460"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.amyork.ca\/academic\/zz\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4460"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.amyork.ca\/academic\/zz\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4460"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}\n
Functionalism<\/h2>\n
Multiple Realizability<\/h2>\n
The Problem of Other Minds<\/h2>\n
Criteria for Consciousness<\/h2>\n
Red-Green Color Blind<\/h2>\n
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Turing\u2019s Test PAlan Turing)<\/h2>\n
Correlational vs. Causal Theories of Consciousness<\/h2>\n